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Payne v. Tennessee: VICTIM 
IMPACT EVIDENCE IS 
CONSTITUTIONALL Y PER-
MISSIBLE IN THE SEN-
TENCING PHASE OF A 
CAPITAL TRIAL. 
In Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. 
Ct. 2597 (1991), the United States 
Supreme Court held that victim 
impact evidence in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding is not per se 
barred by the Eighth Amendment. 
In an opinion delivered by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the Court held 
that evidence of the victim's per-
sonal characteristics and the emo-
tional impact of the murder on the 
victim's family can be considered 
by the sentencing jury, as well as 
argued by the prosecutor at a capital 
sentencing hearing. In so holding, 
the Court overruled the recently es-
tablished precedent of Booth v. 
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), 
and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 
U.S. 805 (1989). 
Pervis Tyrone Payne was con-
victed by ajury oftwo counts offirst 
degree murder and one count of 
assault with intent to commit mur-
der. The murder victims were 
Charisse Christopher and her two 
year old daughter, Lacie. Herthree 
year old son, Nicholas, survived the 
assault. Commenting in his closing 
argument as to the lasting effects of 
the murders on Nicholas, the pros-
ecutor encouraged the jury to return 
a verdict that demonstrated justice 
was done. During the sentencing 
phase ofthe trial, the defendant pre-
sented mitigating evidence through 
testimony by his mother, father, girl-
friend and a clinical psychologist. 
The state then offered the testimony 
of Charisse's mother, Mary 
Zvolanek, who testified as to how 
Nicholas had cried because he 
missed his mother and sister. The 
defendant was sentenced to death 
on each ofthe murder counts and 30 
years imprisonment for the assault ing "all the information necessary 
count. for a first degree murder sentenc-
Rejecting Payne's contention ing." Id. at 2608. Similarly, Gath-
that the admission of victim impact ers barred prosecutors from present-
evidence constituted prejudicial vio- ing victim impact evidence to the 
lations of his Eighth Amendment sentencing jury. Id. at 2609. The 
rights as interpreted in Booth and Court further emphasized that vic-
Gathers, the Supreme Court of Ten- tim impact evidence is offered to 
nesseeaffirmedthetrialcourt'shold- show "each victim's uniqueness as 
ing. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2603-04. an individual human being" and not 
The court found that even if Payne's to encourage comparative judg-
rights were violated under Booth ments of victims. Id. at 2607. The 
and Gathers, the violation "was Court maintained that should evi-
harmless beyond a reasonable dence be introduced ''that is so un-
doubt." Id. (quoting State v. Payne, duly prejudicial, ... the Due Process 
791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990»). Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
The Supreme Court granted cer- ment provides a mechanism for re-
tiorari specifically to reconsider the lief." Id. at 2608. In overruling 
holdings in Booth and Gathers and these decisions, the Court reasoned 
first reviewed the premises relied that mitigating evidence presented 
upon in both of these decisions. by the defendant and victim impact 
The Court specifically considered evidence introduced by the state are 
the premises that victim impact evi- now on equal ground - they are both 
dence "does not reflect on the relevant and constitutionally per-
defendant's'blameworthiness,'''and missible.Id. at 2609. 
that "only evidence addressing the Finally, the petitioner argued that 
defendant's 'blameworthiness' is rel- the Court should adhere to the doc-
evant to the capital sentencing deci- trine of stare decisis and not over-
sion." Id. at 2605. Concluding that rule Booth and Gathers. Id. Ac-
the Booth Court misread the estab- knowledging that stare decisis is 
lished precedent in Woodson v. a preferred policy, the Court con-
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 eluded that it need not follow prece-
(1976), that "a capital defendant dent when such governing decisions 
must be treated as a uniquely indi- as Booth and Gathers "are unwork-
vidual human being," the Court able or badly reasoned." Id. In a 
stated that such misreading unfairly concurring opinion, Justice Scalia 
weighted the scales in a capital trial. pointed out that the doctrine is a 
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. The reflection of the principal that ''the 
Court stressed that while a capital settled practices and expectations of 
defendant may present virtually un- a democratic society should gener-
limited "relevant mitigating evi- ally not be disturbed by the courts." 
dence," the state is prohibited from Id. at 2614, (Scalia, J., concurring). 
presentingevidencethatwouldshow Justice Scalia suggested it was 
"a glimpse of the [victim's] life, or Booth, and not Payne that compro-
that would demonstrate ''the loss to mised the doctrines' fundamental 
the victim's family and to society." values.Id. 
Id. Justice Marshall, joined by Jus-
The Court, therefore, found that tice Blackmun, filed a powerful dis-
Booth deprived the state of the "full sent criticizing the majority of exer-
moral force of its evidence" and cising power, not reason, in its 
couldpreventthejuryfromevaluat- decisionmaking. Id. at 2619 
__________________________ 22.1/The Law Forum - 41 
(Marshall, 1., dissenting). Noting 
that the only change in the four year 
interim between the decisions in 
Booth and Gathers and Payne was 
the personnel ofthe Court, Marshall 
maintained that the real inquiry 
should be whether the majority sat-
isfied the extraordinary showing of 
special justification required before 
overruling Court precedent. [d. at 
2619-21. 
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined 
by Justice Blackmun, emphasized 
that our capital punishment juris-
prudence has allowed the sentenc-
ing jury to consider only mitigating 
evidence concerning the offense and 
the character of the defendant. [d. at 
2626-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens asserted that evi-
dence which served no purpose other 
than appealing to the "sympathies 
or emotions of the jurors has never 
been considered admissible." [d. at 
2626. The dissent accused the ma-
jority of abandoning the "rules of 
relevance that are older than the 
Nation itself." [d. at 2627. 
With this decision, the Supreme 
Court has overruled recently de-
cided cases and disregarded prece-
dent by holding victim impact evi-
dence constitutionally permissible. 
A state may now allow a sentencing 
jury to consider victim impact evi-
dence, and a prosecutor may argue 
victim impactto the sentencingjury. 
The Court's broad interpretation of 
"relevant evidence" will have far 
reaching implications for capital 
defendants, the families oftheir vic-
tims, and to society as a whole. 
- Belinda P. Gardner 
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Rust v. Sullivan: SUPREME 
COURT UPHOLDS AGENCY 
REGULATIONS PROHIBIT-
ING THE COUNSELING, 
REFERRAL OR PROVISION 
OF INFORMATION CON-
CERNING ABORTION AS A 
METHOD OF FAMILY PLAN-
NING. 
In a five to four decision, the 
Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan, 
III S. Ct. 1759 (1991), upheldregu-
lations of the Public Health Ser-
vices Act requiring recipients oITitie 
X funds to refrain from engaging in 
abortion counseling, referral, and 
provision of information concern-
ing abortion as a method of family 
planning. The Court gave extreme 
deference to the Department of 
Health and Human Services and 
upheld the regulations on the ground 
of statutory construction. In addi-
tion, the Court found the regula-
tions were not violative ofthe First 
or Fifth Amendments. 
Title X ofthe Public Health Ser-
vice Act, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 
300a-6), was originally enacted by 
Congress in 1970 to provide federal 
funding for family-planning ser-
vices. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764. The 
Act authorized the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (the 
Secretary) to provide funding to 
public or nonprofit private entities 
to operate family planning projects. 
The Secretary was also authorized 
to promulgate such regulations as 
deemed necessary to carry out the 
intent of the statute. [d. (citing 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300(a), 300a-4 (1970». 
Section 1008 of the Act provided 
that "[n]one of the funds appropri-
ated under this subchapter shall be 
used in programs where abortion is 
a method offamily planning." Rust, 
111 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970». 
In 1988, after determining that 
current regulations failed to prop-
erly implement the statute, the Sec-
retary promulgated new regulations 
designed to provide "clear and op-
erational guidance to grantees [of 
Title X funds] to preserve the dis-
tinction between Title X programs 
and abortion as a method of family 
planning." Rust, IllS. Ct. at 1765 
(quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-24 
(1988». Specifically, the regula-
tions attached three conditions for 
receipt ofthe funds. First, the ''Title 
X project may not provide counsel-
ing concerning the use of abortion 
as a method of family planning or 
provide referral for abortion as a 
method of family planning." Rust, 
III S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting42C.F.R. 
§ 59.8(a)(I». Second, recipients of 
Title X funds may not engage in 
activities that "encourage, promote 
or advocate abortion as a method of 
family planning." [d. (quoting 42 
C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989». Third, 
the Title X project must be "physi-
cally and financially separate" from 
any prohibited activity so that an 
"objective integrity and indepen-
dence from prohibited activities" 
remains. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765 
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989». 
The petitioners in this action were 
grantees of Title X funds suing on 
behalf of themselves and their pa-
tients. The petitioners challenged 
the facial validity ofthe new regula-
tions on grounds that they were not 
authorized by Title X and violated 
the First and Fifth Amendment rights 
of Title X patients and the First 
Amendment rights of Title X health 
care providers. The District Court 
for the Southern District of New 
York granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Secretary. Both the 
Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit and the Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision. 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court 
first addressed the Secretary's au-
